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AMEMBASSY BELGRADE

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LIMDIS

FROM VATICAN OFFICE

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NATO FOR AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: CSCE, VT

SUBJECT: THE VATICAN AND HELSINKI: AN ASSESSMENT

1. SUMMARY: VATICAN PARTICIPATION IN THE CSCE PROCESS MARKED ITS RE-ENTRY, AFTER 100 YEARS, IN THE EUROPEAN POLITICAL ARENA, AND WAS SEEN AS A MEANS FOR ADDING "MORAL" TONE TO THE FORMULATION OF FINAL DOCUMENT AND FOR BUTTRESSING ITS OSTPOLITIK--ITS 15 YEAR OLD POLICY OF REACHING MODUS VIVENDI WITH THE EAST EUROPEAN COMMUNIST REGIMES. THE VATICAN LOOKS AT THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT AS AN IMPORTANT HISTORICAL OCCURRENCE, ENSHROUDED WITH SPECIAL SIGNIFICANCE, AND OF HAVING FAR-REACHING INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC DIMENSIONS, PARTICULARLY FOR THE EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES. WHILE THE VATICAN DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT THERE HAS BEEN GENUINE IMPLEMENTATION, IT APPRECIATES THE MODEST SUCCESS IN IMPLEMENTATION.
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MENTATION AND IS ENDEAVORING THROUGH A COMBINATION OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE DIPLOMACY, TO ENCOURAGE EAST EUROPEAN REGIMES TO DO MORE. ITS ADVICE TO THE WEST IS TO REMAIN UNITED IN ASSURING THROUGH PERIODIC REVIEWS THAT THERE IS NO BACKSLIDING IN THE HELSINKI AGREEMENTS, BUT THAT IN DOING SO IT SHOULD AVOID POLEMICAL STYLE. IN VATICAN VIEW, INCREMENTAL (EVEN TOKEN AND SELECTIVE) IMPLEMENTATION IS BETTER THAN NONE FOR THE

SHORT AND MEDIUM TERM BECAUSE IT PERCEIVES THAT FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE HELSINKI AGREEMENTS WOULD REQUIRE DISMANTLING OF THE REGIMES THEMSELVES AND THIS IS NOT A REALISTIC EXPECTATION. END SUMMARY

2. THE APPROACHING CONFERENCE AT BELGRADE ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT PROVIDES AN OPPORTUNE JUNCTURE FOR ANALYZING THE VATICAN'S OVERALL EXPERIENCE DURING THE PAST TWO YEARS AND ITS EVALUATION OF THE CSCE PROCESS. (THE VATICAN, WHILE INTERESTED AND MONITORING CAREFULLY THE PROGRESS ON HELSINKI-RELATED POLITICAL, MILITARY, AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS, FOCUSES PRIMARILY ON BASKET III RELATED ISSUES. THUS THE FOLLOWING ANALYSIS ADDRESSES MOSTLY THE VATICAN'S EXPERIENCE WITH THE IMPLEMENTATION OF BASKET III.)

3. VATICAN OBJECTIVE IN CSCE CONTEXT. THE FIRST THING TO BE SAID IS THAT THE VATICAN WAS PLEASED TO BE A PARTICIPANT IN THE CSCE PROCESS. THIS MET A 100 YEAR-OLD GOAL OF THE PAPACY. THE VATICAN HAD BEEN DENIED, AT ITALIAN INSISTENCE, A PLACE AT MAJOR INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES SINCE 1870, WHEN THE POPE LOST SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE PAPAL STATES AND ROME. PARTICIPATION IN CSCE CONSTITUTED, THEREFORE, THE VATICAN'S FORMAL RE-ENTRY INTO THE EUROPEAN POLITICAL ARENA. SECONDLY, THE VATICAN LOOKED AT THE CONFERENCE AS A MEANS OF ADDING A "MORAL" TONE TO THE DELIBERATIONS AND TO THE FORMULATION OF THE FINAL DOCUMENT. THIRDLY, IT LOOKED TO THE CSCE PROCESS TO BUTTRESS ITS OSTPOLITIK--ITS FIFTEEN YEAR OLD POLICY OF RAPPROACHMENT WITH THE EAST EUROPEAN COMMUNIST REGIMES. THROUGH CONFIDENTIAL

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LINKAGE, IT HOPED TO GIVE ITS OWN POLICY A NEW IMPETUS. OSTPOLITIK AIMS AT ESSENTIALLY THE SAME BASIC OBJECTIVES AS BASKET III: MORE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, MORE FREEDOM TO TRAVEL, INCREASED CONTACTS, MORE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION, ETC. THUS REINFORCED, THE VATICAN HOPED FOR GREATER PROGRESS IN ITS OSTPOLITIK. (THE VATICAN OSTPOLITIK ,
THOUGH INDEPENDENTLY USHERED INTO EXISTENCE BY THE ECUMENICALLY-MINDED POPE JOHN XXIII IN 1963, WAS TO A CERTAIN EXTENT CONDITIONED AND LINKED TO THE GENERAL PACE OF EAST-EWST DETENTE.)

4. THE HOLY SEE THOUGHT IN 1975, AND THINKS NOW, THAT THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT WAS AN IMPORTANT HISTORICAL EVENT. IN ITS VIEW, THE FACT THAT THE ACT WAS DEVELOPED BY CONSENSUAL AGREEMENT AND SOLEMNLY SIGNED BY 35 HEADS OF STATE OR SPECIAL DELEGATES, ENSHROUDS IT WITH SPECIAL SIGNIFICANCE. IN THE VATICAN'S JUDGMENT, THE ACT--THOUGH NOT COMPLETE AND MANY OF ITS PROVISIONS NOT AS TIGHTLY DRAFTED AS ONE MIGHT WISH--PROVIDES A BASIS FOR "BAD CONSCIENCE FOR THOSE WHO DO NOT COMPLY WITH ITS PROVISIONS. THESE PROVISIONS WERE FULLY DEBATED, ADOPTED BY CONSENSUS, AND NO SIGNATORY CAN, "IN GOOD CONSCIENCE," CLAIM THAT IT DID NOT KNOW WHAT IT WAS CONSENTING TO. THERE IS NO OPPORTUNITY, THEREFORE, TO MASK NON-IMPLEMENTATION BY RECOURSE TO DIVERSE INTERPRETATION OF THE CONTENTS OF THE ACT.

5. THE FINAL ACT, IN ADDITION TO ITS IMPORTANT INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS, HAS SUBSTANTIAL INTERNAL SIGNIFICANCE FOR THE PEOPLE OF EASTERN EUROPE. THE ACT HAS PROVIDED "SEEDLINGS OF FREEDOM" THAT WILL ENCOURAGE THE NEWER GENERATION, WHICH IS IMPATIENT FOR CHANGE, AND ALSO THE "ISLANDS OF DISSENT" WITHIN THOSE COUNTRIES (NOTE: THIS JUDGMENT WAS EXPRESSED BY FOREIGN MINISTER ARCHBISHOP CASACOLI TO SENATOR PELL, IN OCTOBER, 1976, LONG BEFORE "CHARTER 77" BEGAN MAKING THE HEADLINES OF THE INTERNATIONAL PRESS.)

6. VATICAN EVALUATION OF IMPLEMENTATION. BECAUSE OF THE ACT'S VALUE AS AN INTERNAL INSTRUMENT WITHIN EE, THE HOLY SEE CONSIDERS THAT THE WEST SHOULD FOLLOW A POLICY OF ENCOURAGING EE TO DO MORE IN THE FIELD OF HUMAN RIGHTS, REALIZING THAT THE HELSINKI APPROACH
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IS NEW AND NEEDS TIME TO MATURE. THUS, TO ASSURE ITS SUCCESS, ONE MUST ADOPT THE LONG-RANGE POINT OF VIEW RATHER THAN TO SEEK QUICK RESULTS THROUGH A CONFRONTATION STANCE WHICH WAS TRIED DURING THE COLD WAR AND FOUND WANTING.

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7. THE HOLY SEE'S PUBLIC POSTURE REFLECTS THE ABOVE CONSIDERATIONS.

EVEN REGARDING THE PROVISIONS WHICH ARE DIRECTLY RELEVANT TO THE VATICAN--SUCH AS RELIGIOUS FREEDOM--IT SEEKS TO ENCOURAGE GRADUAL SMALL STEPS IN THE HOPE OF MAINTAINING AN OPEN CLIMATE FOR DIALOGUE. ITS REASONING IS: SURE, THERE IS NO RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN EE BUT THE FACT IS THAT NO ONE, FROM TOP TO BOTTOM IS REALLY FREE IN THE EAST. SMALL GRAUDAL STEPS IN AN IRREVERSIBLE PROCESS ARE BOUND TO CREATE DESIRABLE FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES. THE VATICAN, PAINFULLY AWARE OF POST WORLD WAR II HISTORY, FEARS THE RE-INSTALLATION OF THE STALINIST IRON CURTAIN.

8. THE HOLY SEE ITSELF CONSIDERS THAT IT WOULD NOT BE HELPFUL TO ADOPT A PUBLIC CONFRONTATION POSTURE AT BELGRADE. ITS ADVICE TO WESTERN GOVERNMENTS HAS BEEN TO SEEK AN HONEST TWO-YEAR ACCOUNTING OF THE PROGRESS MADE IN NON-POLEMICAL STYLE AND TO PROVIDE A LIST WHERE EE COULD DO MORE IN THE FUTURE. IT IS FOR THIS REASON THAT THE VATICAN IS INCLINED TO SUPPORT SOME KIND OF AN INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF PERIODIC MEETINGS FOR ORDERLY REVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION.

9. THE VATICAN IS WELL AWARE THAT EAST EUROPEAN EXILE GROUPS
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IN THE US AND EUROPE HAVE CALLED FOR A CONFRONTATION APPROACH. IN ITS VIEW, THEY ARE FREE TO DO SO AS PUBLIC GROUPS AND AS INDIVIDUALS: IT IS GOOD TO HAVE SUCH GROUPS AND INDIVIDUALS, SUCH AS SOLZHENITSYN, SPEAK OUT ON THE ISSUES. IT BELIEVES, HOWEVER, THAT GOVERNMENTS CANNOT ADOPT SUCH POLEMIC POSTURES. GOVERNMENT POLICIES SHOULD BE BASED ON "TRUTH AND REALITY" NOT ON SENTIMENT. (SEE PARA 13.)

10. PRESSURES FOR A MORE AGGRESSIVE VATICAN POSTURE. THERE HAVE BEEN SUBSTANTIAL PRESSURES ON THE VATICAN TO MOBILIZE ITS RESOURCES (SUCH AS USING VATICAN RADIO BROADCASTS IN 32 LANGUAGES AND THE ISSUING OF A NEW PAPAL ENCYCLICAL CONDEMNING ATHEISTIC COMMUNISM) TO CONDEMN LACK OF IMPLEMENTATION, OR TO DENOUNCE VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN EASTERN EUROPE. THESE HAVE BEEN RESISTED BECAUSE OF THE ASSESSMENT THAT THEY COULD NOT ACHIEVE AS MUCH AS THE POLICY OF ENCOURAGEMENT. IT IS HOPEFUL THAT THE LITTLE STEPS FORWARD WILL, IN THEIR CUMULATIVE EFFECT, PRODUCE SUBSTANTIAL CHANGES FOR MAKING THE REGIMES MORE FREE AND MORE HUMANE. THE POPE, IN PARTICULAR, HAS BEEN DIRECTLY CRITICIZED BY CHURCH TRADITIONALISTS, SUCH AS THE FRENCH ARCHBISHOP LEFEBVRE, FOR HIS OSTPOLITIK AND BY UKRANIAN CARDINAL SLIPJY FOR NOT LEADING A NEW CRUSADE AGAINST COMMUNISM. RESPONDING TO THESE PRESSURES, THE VATICAN HAS ALLOWED ITS PRESS ORGANS TO CARRY REGULARLY STORIES ON VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN EASTERN EUROPE.

11. THE VATICAN'S APPRECIATION OF THE LIABILITIES OF A CONFRONTATION APPROACH IS BASED ON ITS OWN EXPERIENCE OVER THE LAST 15 YEARS OF SEEKING RAPPROACHMENT WITH THE COMMUNIST REGIMES AND ALSO BY THE DEMARACHES WHICH IT HAS RECEIVED FROM THE EAST. DURING CASAROLI'S

VISIT TO SOFIA, NOVEMBER 3-10, 1976, ZHIVKOV MADE TWO UNEQUIVOCAL POINTS: BELGRADE SHOULD NOT BE A FORUM FOR CONFRONTATION AND THAT IT SHOULD CONSIST OF AN ASSESSMENT OF THE WHOLE ACT--BASKETS I AND II INCLUDED. SIMILAR POINTS HAVE BEEN ECHOED IN THE INFORMAL
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CONTACTS WHICH CASAROLI MAINTAINS WITH THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR TO ITALY. THESE PROMPTINGS HAVE UNDOUBTEDLY BEEN ACCOMPANIED WITH SOME SPECIFIC INSTANCES OF IMPLEMENTATION (SEE PARA 14) AS WELL AS SOME COMMITMENTS AS TO FUTURE PROGRESS.

12. BELIEVING THAT PLACING MORE EMPHASIS ON THE POSITIVE ACCOMPLISHMENTS THAN ON THE NEGATIVE ASPECTS WILL IN THE LONG RUN OBTAIN GREATER COOPERATION AND IMPLEMENTATION, THE VATICAN'S PUBLIC APPROACH IS TO PRESENT AT BELGRADE A GENERAL ASSESSMENT, NOTING THAT AHOPEFUL BEGINNING HAD BEEN MADE BY ALL TOWARDS IMPLEMENTATION AND URGING GREATER ACCOMPLISHMENTS IN THE FUTURE.

13. THE HOLY SEE DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT THERE HAS BEEN GENUINE IMPLEMENTATION AND, IN ITS DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS WITH THE EAST, HAS PRESSED HARD FOR IMPLEMENTATION, EVEN GOING SO FAR AS TO THREATEN RECOURSE TO PUBLIC DENUNCIATION. WE KNOW THIS TO BE THE CASE WITH CZECHOSLOVAKIA: THE VATICAN IN LATE 1976, FRUSTRATED AT THE INABILITY TO OBTAIN DEFINITE COMMITMENTS FROM THE GOC (DURING SEVERAL NEGOTIATING SESSIONS IN 1976 AND 1976), PRIVATELY WARNED THAT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR THE POPE TO AVOID MENTIONING DISAPPOINTMENT WITH THE GOC IN HIS 1977 STATE OF THE WORLD MESSAGE. BASED ON PRIVATE ASSURANCES OF FORWARD MOVEMENT, THE POPE AVOIDED SPECIFIC MENTION, BUT WHEN THE GOC FAILED TO COME THROUGH, ON MARCH 4, 1977, THE POPE, IN A PUBLIC STATEMENT TO CZECH BISHOPS, SAID A SPECIAL PRAYER FOR THE "OPPRESSED" IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND STATED THAT THE HOLY SEE WOULD CONTINUE TO "LEAVE NOTHING UNDONE" SO THAT EVERY DIOCESE IN THE COUNTRY HAS ITS OWN BISHOP. WHILE IT IS DISAPPOINTED IN THE OVERALL EASTERN PERFORMANCE, IT REFUSES TO GIVE CAUSE FOR BREAKING THE DIALOGUE. IT WANTS TO BE ENCOURAGING SO THAT THE LITTLE STEPS WHICH HAVE ALREADY BEEN TAKEN ARE FOLLOWED BY ADDITIONAL STEPS, NO MATTER HOW SMALL. THE VATICAN MAINTAINS THAT PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND TRADITIONAL DIPLOMACY GO HAND IN HAND BUT HAVE DIFFERENT ATTRIBUTES AND REQUIREMENTS, ESPECIALLY WITH RESPECT TO EASTERN EUROPE. (COMMENT: IN THIS SENSE, THE VATICAN POSITION IS IN HARMONY WITH THE SECRETARY'S STATEMENT AT THE UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA IN APRIL, 1977, TO THE EFFECT THAT "A DECISION WHETHER AND
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HOW TO ACT IN THE CAUSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS IS A MATTER FOR INFORMED AND CAREFUL JUDGMENT. NO MECHANISTIC FORMULA PRODUCES AN AUTOMATIC

ANSWER.")

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14. PROGRESS AND CONCLUSIONS. THE VATICAN, LIKE OTHERS IN THE WEST, REALIZES THAT THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN EASTERN EUROPE DIFFERS FROM COUNTRY TO COUNTRY. CONCOMMITANTLY, IMPLEMENTATION OF HELSINKI ALSO DIFFERS. NEVERTHELESS THE FOLLOWING GENERAL POINTS CAN BE MADE REGARDING THE VATICAN'S EXPERIENCE: (1) THERE HAS BEEN MORE LIBERAL POLICY AMONG ALL ON THE QUESTION OF FREEDOM OF TRAVEL FOR CLERGY; (2) MORE LIBERAL CONTACT POLICY: VATICAN OFFICIALS ARE RELATIVELY FREER IN HAVING ACCESS TO THE CLERGY IN THE EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES (IN BULGARIA FOR THE FIRST TIME SINCE WORLD WAR I AND IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA FOR THE FIRST TIME SINCE A DECADE AGO); (3) MORE RELIGIOUS MATERIALS ENTER EASTERN EUROPE--FIRST TIME IN LITHUANIA; (4) LEGAL RECOGNITION OF CHURCH STATUS--BULGARIA GRANTED IT IN 1975 AND ROMANIA IS, IN PRINCIPLE, AGREEABLE TO A STATUTE PROVIDING FOR LEGAL RECOGNITION OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH. IN ANY CASE, THE TEMPO OF OFFICIAL CONTACTS INCREASED SUBSTANTIALLY SINCE MID-1975. (FOREIGN MINISTER CASAROLI WENT TO BULGARIA IN NOVEMBER, 1976. THERE HAVE BEEN CONSULTATIONS WITH POLAND, CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND HUNGARY. HUNGARY'S KADAR HAD AN UNPRECEDENTED VISIT WITH THE POPE IN MAY, 1977. CARDINALS WERE APPOINTED, WITH STATE APPRIATION, FOR HUNGARY IN 1976 AND FOR CZECHOSLOVAKIA IN

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1977.)

15. THE HOLY SEE PERCEIVES THAT IMPLEMENTATION BY THE EAST OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS PROVISIONS IS AIDED BY THE FACT THAT THE REGIMES ARE "ATTENTIVE" TO WORLD PUBLIC OPINION. EAST EUROPEAN REGIMES NEED TO GIVE IMPRESSION THAT RELIGION AND OTHER HUMAN RIGHTS ARE TOLERATED. THUS, THEY PURSUE TACTICAL MEANS FOR RESPONDING, I.E. THROUGH MORE PERMISSIONS TO TRAVEL ABROAD, MORE CONTACTS WITH OUTSIDE WORLD, MORE LIBERAL POLICY ON INFORMATION, ETC. THROUGH A SELF-REINFORCING PROCESS, HOWEVER, THE COMBINED IMPACT OF THESE TACTICAL DECISIONS WILL BE TO INSTILL CHANGES AT THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE SYSTEMS. TO AID THIS PROCESS, THE WEST MUST STAND UNITED AND THROUGH PUBLIC AND PRIVATE DIPLOMACY ASSURE THAT THERE BE NO "BACKSLIDING" BY THE REGIMES ON THE COMMITMENTS AT HELSINKI.

16. THE VATICAN IS AWARE ALSO THAT COMMUNIST REGIMES INSTRUMENTALIZE CONTACTS WITH THE POPE AND THE VATICAN TO GIVE IMPRESSION TO WORLD AND DOMESTIC OPINION THAT THEY TOLERATE RELIGION. THIS IS A PRICE THE VATICAN IS WILLING TO PAY BECAUSE OF TWO REASONS. SINCE THE SECOND VATICAN COUNCIL, IT HAS SOUGHT ACTIVELY A DIALOGUE WITH THE WORLD AT LARGE, INCLUDING DIALOGUE WITH "NONBELIEVERS." (POPE PAUL, IN 1965, INSTITUTED A SECRETARIAT FOR NONBELIEVERS AND IN 1977, THE VATICAN ESTABLISHED A CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF MARXISM AT THE PONTIFICAL ACADEMY.) THUS, DESPITE THE CRITICISM, IT CANNOT REFUSE TO TALK OR TO CLOSE THE DOOR TO MARXIST CHIEFS OF STATE OR EVEN COMMUNIST PARTY CHIEFS. POPE PAUL, AFTER SOME TREPIDATION, RECEIVED THE HUNGARIAN PARTY CHIEF KADAR IN JUNE 1977, AND HAS AGREED TO RECEIVE POLISH PARTY CHIEF GIEREK THIS COMING NOVEMBER. SECONDLY, IT JUDGES THAT THESE CONTACTS ARE THEMSELVES INSTRUMENTS THROUGH WHICH THE VATICAN AND THE POPE ARE ENDEAVORING TO OBTAIN A "LITTLE MORE LIBERTY FOR THE CHRISTIANS" AS CARDINAL KONIG, THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECRETARIAT FOR NON-BELIEVERS AND FREQUENT VISITOR TO EAST EUROPE, PUT IT IN AN INTERVIEW IN THE FRENCH PUBLICATION

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LA CROIX, AUGUST 12, 1977.

17. THE REGIMES THEMSELVES LOOK TO THEIR VATICAN CONTACTS AS MEANS OF GAINING AN ADDITIONAL DIMENSION OF "LEGITIMACY" AS IN THE CASES OF HUNGARY, POLAND, AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA, OR "RECOGNITION" AS IN THE CASE OF EAST GERMANY OR "BROADENED INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT" AS IN THE CASES OF ROMANIA AND BULGARIA. WHERE THE SALUTARY EFFECTS OF THESE FACTORS ARE LACKING AS IN THE CASE OF THE USSR, THE VATICAN HAS LITTLE TO SHOW FOR ITS EFFORTS. THE SOVIETS HAVE MADE ONLY "TOKEN" CONCESSIONS TO THE VATICAN: INCREASED TRAVEL PERMISSION FOR

BISHOPS FROM THE BALTIC REPUBLICS TO COME TO ROME; AUTHORIZATION TO IMPORT RELIGIOUS MATERIALS INTO LITHUANIA; THE QUIET OPENING UP OF SEVERAL CATHOLIC PRAYER CENTERS IN CENTRAL ASIA AND SIBERIA; AND THE RESOLUTION OF SEVERAL FAMILY REUNIFICATION CASES IN WHICH THE POPE EXPRESSED AN INTEREST. THE VATICAN, OF COURSE, REALIZES THAT THE SOVIETS MONITOR CAREFULLY VATICAN CONSULTATIONS WITH EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND ARE THE ULTIMATE ARBITERS OF THE PACE AND SUBSTANCE OF THE CONSULTATIONS. THE VATICAN BELIEVES, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT THE USSR RETARDED PROGRESS IN VATICAN/EAST EUROPEAN RAPPROACHMENT IN 1975-76, IN ORDER TO PRESSURE VATICAN ON QUESTIONS RELATING TO EAST GERMANY. VATICAN ALSO BELIEVES THAT RELATIVE LACK OF PROGRESS IN VATICAN-CZECHOSLOVAKIAN RELATIONS IS LARGELY DUE TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA'S NERVOUSNESS REGARDING THE ATTITUDE OF THE SOVIETS AND LOOKS TO THE LATTER FOR HELP IN STIMULATING THE CZECHS TO BE MORE FORTHCOMING.

18. ON BALANCE, THE VATICAN REMAINS "HOPEFUL" OF PROSPECTS FOR CONTINUING PROGRESS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE HELSINKI UNDERTAKINGS. GARDNER

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